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The realities of global economy, including the increase commitment 
of the North to hegemonic tendencies, have again revived interests 
in regional integration and cooperation, with better and improved 
acceptance in the South. Motives for regional cooperation include 
broad economic, social and political interests, and the need for 
greater international bargaining power in the world economy. 
Although most of the regional integration schemes in the South have 
always claimed responsibility for promoting regional cooperation and 
integration, the practical results, however, have been very 
disappointing. Nevertheless governments in the South have regularly 
declared their commitment to the ideals of regional cooperation as 
a strategy for self-reliance and development. The critical question is 
how integration and cooperative schemes are they fairing (or are 
likely to fare) under the ‘new’ global regimes on trade? The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is our case 
study for testing our key hypotheses on the challenges and 
opportunities for the regional integrations schemes in the South 
against the background of ‘new’ global trade regimes. We examine 
the  paths taken by countries in West Africa to bring about regional 
cooperation and integration and ask the question what is the impact 
of globalization, especially in terms of the pressures of global 
market forces on integration processes in the South. What is the 
influence of the regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
other global forces? What is the impact of the global market forces 
on the capability of regional integration schemes in the South to 
work towards achieving collective self-reliance? What is the extent 
of resistance of the South to the inequality and inequities that 
characterized the global economic system? In this paper we point 
out that that current African regional strategies are rather seeking 
accommodation within (also and closer cooperation with) the global 
trade system and its powerful international agencies. Recent 
developments in the cooperation between African regional blocs and 
the USA through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
and the EU through the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) are cases in 
point. Also, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated 
in the Post-Cotonou era is no less important in this regard. These 
initiatives are far from promoting collective self-reliance in Africa. 
Rather the trends have pointedly showed the need to redefine the 
goals and strategies of regional integration in Africa beyond the 
constraining influences of global market forces.  
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 I. Introduction25.2 The Evolution and Dynamics of West 
African Integration 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was 
established in 1975 as an economic integration scheme. Until 1999 
when Mauritania withdrew its membership, the ECOWAS was made 
up of sixteen West African countries, including seven countries, 
which belonged to the Communante Economic de l’Afrique de l’ 
Quest (CEAO), and three countries that are in the Mano River Union 
(MRU). It is the biggest regional integration scheme out of about 40 
single-purpose and multi-purpose inter-governmental organisations 
(IGOs) that dot the West African landscape.  However, except in the 
matter of regional security, and to some extent the promotion of 
democracy and good governance in West Africa, the performance of 
the ECOWAS generally have been less impressive.  The experience of 
the ECOWAS, and also that of other regional and cooperative and 
integrative schemes in South  are necessarily provoking discourse 
about contents, forms, logic and values of regional integration 
schemes on the continent. Many development analysts are asking 
questions about the actual and potential capacities of many of these 
schemes to accelerate development processes in a way that reduce 
their dependency on the North. 
Arguably globalization is increasingly been made complex with 
developments in global trade regimes that seek for the liberalization 
of the international trading system. Also, developments within 
Europe, notably the efforts towards increased integration of 
European economies are reinforcing new global trade regimes. These 
developments are already presenting African regional groupings such 
as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with 
challenges. For example, the ECOWAS, representing West African 
countries which have relationship with EU, first under the EU-ACP 
Conventions (the Lome Conventions) and lately the Cotonou 
Agreement, is negotiating with the EU for a free trade area to the 
‘benefits’ of the two. Under the Cotonou Agreement preferential 
market access commitments are to be made on the basis of 
reciprocity which is in contrast to what obtained under the Lome 
Conventions.  The terms and conditions of the reciprocal references 
are being negotiated between the EU and the ECOWAS. These 
negotiations are to be concluded by 1 January 2008, until which 
date non-reciprocal preferences under the Cotonou Agreement will 
be preserved. These negotiations are expected to be in conformity 
with WTO rules. Indeed they are meant to produce ‘WTO 
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compatible’ outcomes, which in effect, will serve to further 
consolidate the hegemony of the WTO. The EU in its negotiations 
with the ECOWAS is already espousing multilateral trade 
liberalization, and at the same time seeks free trade with West 
Africa. The critical question is whether a mutually beneficial 
agreement is possible between two unequal partners. It is also 
critical to ask whether the transformation from non-reciprocal trade 
agreements to reciprocal trade agreement will not make the 
agreements between EU and the ACP countries totally irrelevant. 
This shows that the EPAs and other initiatives like the US-sponsored 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are far from promoting 
collective self-reliance in the South. They are rather seeking 
accommodation within (also and closer cooperation with) the global 
trade system and its powerful international agencies. Rather these 
trends and developments have pointedly showed the need to 
redefine the goals and strategies of regional integration in Africa 
beyond the constraining influences of global market forces. 
This paper critically discusses the challenges of development as well 
as opportunities for the ECOWAS. It re-examines the philosophical 
and theoretical foundation of the ECOWAS, and also reviews some 
specific cooperative and integrative programmes of the ECOWAS 
within the last three decades. It also unveils both its unsung 
accomplishments and frustrations in the pursuit of development and 
collective self-reliance as goals of regional integration. Arguably, 
the experience of the ECOWAS is representative of other integrative 
and cooperative initiatives in Africa, not only in terms of its 
evolution and dynamics but also its challenges and opportunities as a 
modern integration scheme. Also, in this paper we point out that 
that current African regional strategies are rather seeking 
accommodation within (also and closer cooperation with) the global 
trade system and its powerful international agencies. Recent 
developments in the cooperation between African regional blocs and 
the USA through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
and the EU through the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) are cases in 
point. Also, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated 
in the Post-Cotonou era is no less important in this regard. These 
initiatives are far from promoting collective self-reliance in Africa. 
Rather the trends have pointedly showed the need to redefine the 
goals and strategies of regional integration in Africa beyond the 
constraining influences of global market forces.  
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II. Conceptual and theoretical foundation  
The ‘success’ of the European integration was able to conceal for 
long time the deficiencies of the received theories. However, new 
evidences have emerged that show these extant theories as largely 
inadequate for explaining the process of regional integration in the 
South. Among other things, these theories fail to give satisfactory 
account of the roots of integration among the less developed 
countries (LDCs). For example, the critique of the functionalist/neo-
functionalist perspectives and the classical custom union theory has 
shown them to be based on restrictive assumptions. Similarly, the 
formulations by the dependency theorists are now known to be 
having limited bearing on the evaluation of gains from integration in 
the South. This is one of the background justifications for re-
examining existing theoretical treatments of regional integration 
initiatives in Africa, including the ECOWAS. 
The concept of regional integration is still largely elusive to define, 
either in terms of geographical or economic boundaries. The 
ECOWAS is an example of regional groupings in Africa that has strict 
geographical context and whose members have historical and 
cultural ties. While the debate is still on among scholars on the 
meaning of ‘integration’, there seems to be agreement on one issue 
that integration can be regarded as a process or as a state of affairs 
reached by that process. According to Fritz Machlup, the question as 
to whether that state has to be terminal point or intermediate point 
in the process can be taken care of by distinguishing between 
‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ integration. The more difficult 
question according to him is: what is that to be integrated; people, 
areas, markets, production, goods, resources, policies, or what? 
Although ‘integration’ and ‘cooperation’ have been used 
interchangeably by integration scholars, there is a fundamental 
difference between the two. The difference is both in qualitative 
and quantitative contexts. While ‘cooperation’ may be employed to 
identify loose forms of interstate activity designed to meet some 
commonly experienced needs, ‘integration’ refers to a much more 
formal arrangement that involves some political and economic 
sacrifices as well as commitments, concessions, processes and 
political will to redefine participation in the international economy. 
In this regard regional cooperation may be a phase in the process of 
regional integration. 
Economic integration is often defined in terms of trade liberalization 
or absence of economic discrimination among economic units. 
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However, such a definition can be misleading for Africa. For 
instance, based on of a common tariff and free movement of capital 
and labour, the East African Common Market in 1963 was more 
‘integrated’ than the European Common Market. But only 20 per 
cent of the total trade of East African countries was with their 
partners within the region whereas European Economic Community 
(EEC) had 40 per cent of trade among its members. Based on (mis)
conception, many self-styled common markets, federations, unions 
and communities have emerged in Africa without promoting regional 
integration or even showing any potential to do so. The conception 
of regional integration as the progressive elimination of trade and 
tariff discrimination between national borders is too restrictive. 
The customs union theory dominates the literature on economic 
integration and Jacob Viner’s pioneering work is noted in this 
regard. The customs union approach focuses on production effects 
as well as the realization of more efficient utilization of productive 
resources. According to Viner, the primary purpose of a custom 
union is to shift sources of supply; a shift which may either be to 
lower cost sources, or to higher cost sources. The basic theoretical 
concepts in Viner’s analysis are those of ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade 
diversion’. The Vinerian approach argues that the desired ‘trade 
creation’ can be achieved if: (i) member countries are initially 
competitive but potentially complimentary in trade (ii) intra-
regional trade, in proportion to total trade, is relatively high; (iii) 
the ratio of foreign to domestic commerce is low. It follows thus, 
that, where a customs union consist of countries with widely 
differing comparative advantages, an economic union will assist to 
rationalize their production pattern with prospect for trade 
creation. 
Also, where countries have similar comparative advantages and they 
consequently have to trade merely among themselves rather than 
with one another, economic union will lead to trade diversion. In the 
South scarcely do countries meet the conditions for trade creation, 
particularly in situation such as in West Africa where the economies 
are competitive rather than complimentary. Arhur Hazlewood 
observed quite early that the removal of barriers between African 
countries “would not have any redistributive effects on the patter of 
production within the union, replacing high cost of domestic 
production by lower-cost supplies from members of the union”. 
Adebayo Adedeji, also considering the prospect of custom union type 
of regional integration for West Africa, concluded that “the 
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formation of a custom union or economic community in the region 
would appear irrelevant if not positively harmful”. It is now 
commonly acknowledged that classical custom union theory cannot 
accommodate the interests of countries in Africa.  
Classical customs union theory has been said to be a mere disguised 
argument for free trade. The argument is that the same grounds for 
preferring a customs union to national tariffs are reasons for 
preferring universal free trade to custom unions. Some critics of 
conventional theory of customs have rejected the notion that it is 
largely irrelevant to LDCs. The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA) took the lead in this regard. It found the 
classical customs union theories too ‘economistic’ and recommended 
customs union as a means of collective import substitution in 
developing areas. The ECLA School advocated for a strategy that 
would address the ‘trade gap’ between the underdeveloped 
countries and the industrialized ones through programmes of 
industrialization and import substitution which in effect translated 
to the replacement of extra-regional manufactures by local one. In 
this way custom unions offer protected markets for adequate size 
for industrial development. Thus ECLA proposed a regionalism which 
would unite some groups of countries by separating them from 
others. On the evidence of the most member-states of the ECOWAS, 
the strategy of import substitution has generated more than 
expected crisis.  Although most integration schemes among LDCs 
have continued to emphasize ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’ 
as the basis for evaluating the gains and loss of regional integration,  
their experiences in practical terms however have been that as soon 
it became expensive to purchase within the union, such schemes 
were abandoned.  
While it can be argued that the ECLA School moved forward the 
discourse on regional integration in the South, the “wedding of 
orthodox development economics and traditional integration theory” 
was unable to provide necessary justification for economic 
integration among LDCs. Admittedly it was worst for the protagonists 
of classical customs union approach. They got carried away with the 
experience of Europe, forgetting that the effect of ‘trade diversion’ 
and ‘trade creation’ on the two environments varies according to 
the difference in social conditions. They failed in their 
considerations to appreciate underdevelopment and disarticulation 
within the economies of the LDCs while they assume a full utilization 
of production factors. 
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The dependency school argued for a re-conceptualization of the 
purpose of regional integration in the South. The argument is that 
economic integration should aim at creating economic stimulus 
among member states – an alternative development strategy that 
will enhance rapid economic development and eliminate 
underdevelopment.  The dependency school for instance advocated 
for a re-examination of such issues that politics of integration.  This 
path has already been illuminated by the works of Andrew Axline, 
Lynn Mytelka, S.K.B Asante, and also Raph Onwuka, Steven Wright 
and Amadu Sessay. These scholars considered the impact of 
exogenous factors on the process of integration among Third World 
countries, posited that the cooperative and integrative efforts of 
Third World countries mostly centre on “the hegemonic input and 
dominant influence of the North” which “have conditioned and 
determined the outcome of integration arrangement”. 
Consequently, “all African countries, individually and collectively 
remain integrated with the international market than they are 
among themselves”.   
The traditional validity of the dependency school’s criticism of the 
role industrial bourgeoisie in Africa integration processes is easily 
noted in their postulations that emphasize the dangers in over-
capitalization of integration schemes and the result of the 
imposition of transplanted market conditions into the African 
continent to serve foreign interests. Characteristically, such forces 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and factors like the debt 
crisis and the activities of TNCs have been identified by dependency 
theorists as imperialist agents for the reproduction of conditions of 
dependency in Africa. 
Lynn Mytelka developed a framework for integration among LDCs 
which seriously reviews the relationship of the social forces within 
integrated economies. Mytelka’s postulations question the logic of 
‘laissez-faire’ (Type 1) which informs a number of integrative efforts 
in the Third World, especially the bias towards trade expansion. By 
neglecting the peculiar problems of the less-developed countries, 
through unreserved support for free trade without regard for the 
ability or inability to take advantage of available opportunities (if 
any), the application of the ‘laissez-faire’ model could only promote 
competition and conflict from the promulgation of protectionist 
policies by participation countries.  Some of the problems associated 
with the pursuit of regional integration through the custom union 
model find some parallels in the Type I model.  It is good to know 
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that there are aspects of the ECOWAS’ mandates that emphasized 
the free trade model. 
Mytelka’s Type II model of regional scheme is constructed to 
transcend the limitations of the Type I in some respects. The 
ECOWAS easily falls within this category.  It includes mechanism for 
the distribution of losses and gains of integration as it is in the case 
of the ECOWAS. While it is common for such integration schemes to 
feature policies and programmes of compensation and correction 
such as the establishment of special funds and polices on allocation 
of industries within the region etc., none of these measures is able 
to avert crisis in the distribution of obligations and benefits. For 
example, in the 1970s the ECOWAS experienced a bureaucratic crisis 
that was more as a result of the dynamics of underdeveloped West 
African economy rather than personality conflict between the 
Managing Director of the ECOWAS Fund and the Executive Secretary. 
Given the inherent structural contractions of Third World 
economies, conflicts over the distribution of obligations and gains in 
regional economic schemes are endemic. In the words of Lyn 
Mytelka, “the principal contradiction is generated by the interplay 
of a nationalist orientation towards inter-regional bargaining 
processes and the distortions resulting from dependence. This 
dynamic interaction of nationalism and dependence explain the 
failure of corrective mechanisms in Type II system”. 
On the evidence of the ECOWAS, it is now known that mere reforms 
such as the provision of built-in compensatory and corrective system 
are incapable of resolving the structural contradictions in the Third 
World countries. These measures, in effect, cannot generate the 
necessary political will or economic capacity to restructure the 
internal economies, reduce the power of foreign capital, and 
establish a strong foundation for self-reliance. As argued by 
Constantine Vaitos, any analysis of integration in the less developed 
region should go beyond mere emphasis on the form of network of 
exchanges and interactions. There is need to appreciate “the 
conditions imposed by economic and political environment within 
which they (regional schemes) are supposed to operate”.  In this 
regard, the network of exchanges are to be considered along with 
interactions based on the networks of power, knowledge, and 
information which are not equally distributed for all integrating 
countries, or even tending towards equilibrating conditions. Vaitos 
further advocated for regional integration that is built around four 
key issues areas to answer such questions as who integrates and for 
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whose benefits. The four key areas include: i) the local socio-
economic and political interests served by integration; ii) the 
influence of foreign governments and private interests; iii) the 
relationship between structural characteristics and choice of 
integration schemes; and iv) key issues relating to process and key 
issues relating to process and duration of integration stages, the 
peculiar nature and trade and the requirement of inter-country 
distributional considerations.   
The Type III model in Mytelka’s formulation is a remarkable 
advancement compared to the previous two types discussed above. 
Usually, it is constructed to resolve the contradictions of regional 
dependence through the introduction of some measures. In this 
model the efforts essentially seek solutions to the problem of 
unequal distribution of gains and polarization. The measures may 
include arrangements to attack the conditions of dependence 
through some complex institutional frameworks. In some cases this 
model may include the establishment of a ‘regime’ for direct 
investment and foreign capital which can regulate external linkages. 
The major limitation of the Type III is its apolitical policy 
prescriptions for attacking the conditions of dependence. This 
means programmes are just introduced without provision for 
necessary political weapon for ensuring autocentric regionalism. For 
instance while some integrative schemes provide for progressive 
localization of industry, this arrangement may not necessarily 
include a programme for nationalization of industry or socialization 
of production process and exchange.  In several cases regional 
schemes in the South merely initiate regional strategies for 
development that hardly go beyond the inauguration of over-
ambitious programmes that are not properly conceived and 
therefore suffer premature death. In the case of the ECOWAS for 
example, the ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP) is 
as good as non-existing. It is possible to argue that the EMCP just 
like many other programmes were not conceived with adequate 
consideration for social and political factors. 
The ECOWAS model is no more than a ‘hybridisation’ of ‘laissez 
faire’ and the custom union theory with only scanty attention given 
to the crisis of dependency and underdevelopment in the sub-region. 
This, in effect, resulted in the restriction of goals of integration 
largely to the economic domain with emphasis on purely economic 
performance as key indicators of integration. This approach was 
dominant especially in the early days of the ECOWAS, and even up to 
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the time of the approval of the Revised Treaty.  It would appear 
that the Lagos Treaty (1975) in effect was essentially meant to guide 
trade relations among member-states.  
In contrast to the above, regional integration represents a much 
more formal arrangement which require states to make certain 
political and economic sacrifices and commitments as well as 
concessions, and demonstrates political will towards a redefinition 
of their individual and collective participation in the international 
economy. There is the sense in which some of the provisions in the 
Revised ECOWAS Treaty demonstrate this ideal. It is worth noting 
that with regional integration conceived strictly in terms of 
economic relations among the states involved, the role of the 
ECOWAS as an economic community for long was not more than 
creating some infrastructures where commodities can be exchanged 
at a reasonable cost. Exchange and markets are to be set up to 
facilitate movements of good and people.  
Regional integration in the South is an extremely complicated and 
varied phenomenon which is conditioned by socio-economic and 
political dynamics that are different from what obtain in the North. 
Therefore the theory of regional integration in the South  must 
recognize the unity of the processes of economic integration, 
political integration and social integration, and also provide for 
political weapon as part of the strategies for implementing regional 
integration programmes.  
The absence of the political dimension in most of the existing 
theoretical formulations on regional integration in the South has 
made some questions increasingly more relevant in any discourse on 
regional integration in the South. What are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for successful regional integration? Should 
regional integration be approached through the custom union model? 
Are preferential trade areas more preferable? As many as there are 
such questions are types of regional integration schemes in the 
South whose philosophical guide derives mostly from the experience 
of the North. It is to be noted however that each of these forms of 
integration arrangements has its own regularities, class contents, 
and mechanisms of operation. An in-depth analysis of the 
performance of ECOWAS in some key areas of the regional 
integration reveals these and other variables.  
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III. Performance and track record 
The ECOWAS was set up “to promote cooperation and development 
in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, 
transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social 
and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living 
of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of 
fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to 
the progress and development of the African continent”. Modeled as 
a custom union, the ECOWAS Treaty and protocols provide a 
plethora of integrative instruments in form of several monetary, 
fiscal, administrative, institutional and legal measures. In 1996 the 
ECOWAS Treaty was revised to enable the ECOWAS address new 
realities, notably the global craze for democratization, good 
governance, and human rights. The upsurge of incessant conflicts, 
illegal cross-border activities in West Africa and the opportunities 
provided by the African Economic Community expectedly provoked 
collective response among West African countries with the ECOWAS 
providing an appropriate platform. However, by and large, it is 
evident that ECOWAS has not succeeded in achieving its stated goals 
and objectives.  
 
Trade liberalization/Intra-regional trade  
The ECOWAS as a regional integration arrangement has the aim to 
eliminate all tariff and non-tariff restriction on intra-ECOWAS trade, 
establish a common external tariff and commercial policy against 
non-ECOWAS countries abolish all obstacles to the movement of all 
factors of production, and harmonize domestic policies across its 
member-countries. In this regard a comprehensive trade 
liberalization programme was designed. It was to become 
operational in 1979, but had to be postponed till 1990 when it was 
finally launched. The implementation of the programme was 
planned for three stages. The first stage is for an immediate and full 
liberalization of trade in unprocessed goods and traditional 
handicrafts while the second stage seeks for the liberalization of 
trade in industrial products, with the phasing reflecting the 
differences in the levels of development of three categories of the 
ECOWAS member-states. The third stage focuses on the gradual 
establishment of a common external tariff. The trade liberalization 
scheme of the ECOWAS is by and large a progressive reduction 
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culminating in the elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers 
against intra-ECOWAS trade.  The annual tariff reduction rates 
varied among the three categories of countries: (i) the most 
advanced of the countries whose schedule was expected to be in 6 
years; (ii) the middle group of countries whose completion period 
was set at 8 years middle group of countries; and the third group 
whose schedule was expected to last up 10 years. 
According to the agreed implementation schedule, total elimination 
of all trade barriers was expected to occur by the end of 1999. But 
as at that time only one country was able to operate in compliance 
with the agreed obligation. The Authority of ECOWAS in December 
1999 approved a new proposal - the Nigeria-Ghana fast-track 
approach - which suggested the elimination of all trade barriers by 
15 April 2000 and the establishment of a common external tariff by 1 
January 2001. In spite of the moves by ECOWAS to catch up with 
UEMOA, not very much has been achieved and there are issues yet 
unresolved such as the relationship between the ECOWAS and 
UEMOA and how ECOWAS plans to complete the convergence of its 
trade liberalization programmes with that of UEMO .  
In practical terms, the ECOWAS has not been able to increase intra-
West Africa trade. For example, intra-ECOWAS export and import 
trade was only 9.25 per cent and 13.61 per cent of total West Africa 
export and import trade in 2001. In contrast, the ECOWAS export 
and import trade with EU was 31.44 per cent and 45.5 per cent of 
total West Africa export and import trade for the same period. This 
unimpressively low rate of intra-ECOWAS trade cannot provide the 
required wider market which is needed for modern industrial 
growth. Also, the structure of trade links with the metropolitan 
countries has implications for the development of local industry in 
West Africa to produce manufactured good as component of intra-
ECOWAS trade.  
 
Regional approach to industrialisation  
The theoretical basis of the approach of the ECOWAS to 
industrialisation results from the arguments in favour of customs 
union formation among developing countries, as opposed to 
traditional static welfare gains operations. As part of strategies of 
the ECOWAS for promoting industrial development in West Africa, 
member states are expected to cooperate with one another in the 
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exchange of industrial plans, avoid unhealthy rivalry and waste of 
resources, and harmonise their industrial policies to avoid disruption 
resulting from dissimilar policies.  In West Africa the need to 
harmonise policies is higher in the industrial sector than in any other 
sector. During the negotiation for the ECOWAS most of the states 
supported efforts geared towards a rational development of industry 
in West Africa as the foundation for an eventual coordinated 
regional approach to industrial development. Thus the provisions on 
harmonization of industrial policies, which are the subjects of 
Chapter V (Articles 28 & 32) of the ECOWAS Treaty, were seen as 
relief by most member states. Unlike the implementation of the 
provisions on trade which in the Treaty is timed, the provisions for 
the harmonisation of industrial policies make no reference to any 
time-table for implementation. The provisions, however, provide for 
a three-stage approach for the hamonisation of industrial policies 
within the framework of custom union model  
Apart from the provisions in Chapter V, there are other provisions of 
the Treaty that address the issue of industrialisation. There are 
Articles 27 and 39, for instance, that provide for free movement of 
‘factors’ within the Community in a bogus fashion. For instance, 
there are no definite provisions on strategy for harmonizing the 
politics of indigenisation of individual   member states of the 
Community. Also, there is the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation 
and Development, which was established by Article 50. The Fund’s 
main purpose is to reverse possible inequity in development 
resulting from the application of the provisions of the Treaty on the 
liberalization of trade within the Community, as well as on the 
harmonisation of industrial policies. The Fund shall derive its 
resources from sources as well as other foreign sources which 
include “receipts from bilateral and multilateral sources as well as 
other foreign sources”. Chapters VII and IX of the Treaty also contain 
provisions that are of relevance to industrial developments. There 
are provisions on programmes for the common evolution of common 
policies and joint development of transport, communication, and 
energy and other relevant infrastructures within the Community. 
By 1983 the ECOWAS has been able to put in place an Industrial 
Cooperation Policy whose objective is “to adopt a sub-regional 
approach to economic development which would include market 
integration (liberalization and promotion of intra-Community trade) 
and physical integration (in the areas of production, infrastructure, 
transport, communication, natural resources and energy”.  The 
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Industrial Cooperation Policy is drawn around the idea that sub-
regional approach to industrial development should give priority to 
industries that will contribute to the modernization and promotion 
of other sectors. The Policy is also aimed at “establishing the 
industrial foundations of the Community by promoting intermediate 
goods and input production industries”.  This is expected to 
facilitate the specialisation of states or groups of states within the 
sub-region.  
Since the end of the 1980s, cooperation activities in the industrial 
sector have been essentially on the Community’s Industrial 
Development Programme adopted in 1986. Activities under the 
Programme include rehabilitation of industrial enterprises, 
coordination of production activities through the involvement of the 
private sectors in member states, regional cooperation in industrial 
training, sponsorship of West African               Industrial Forum, and 
coordination of the IDDA programmes in West Africa. While these are 
accomplishments in some respects, the pursuit of the goal of 
industrialisation within the framework of customs union in the 
ECOWAS region has only encouraged the extension of national 
import substitution by individual member state to regional level. 
The industrial structure of West Africa and types of dominant 
industrial activities further reveals the weakness of import-
substitution strategy for regional approach to industrial development 
in West Africa.  
  
Free movement  
Based on the provisions in Article 2(2d) of the Treaty of ECOWAS, 
“the community shall by stages ensure the abolition as between the 
Member-States of the obstacles to the free movement of persons 
services and capital”, while Article 27(i) confers the status of 
community citizenship on the citizens of member-states, and enjoins 
member-states to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and 
residence within the Community. The ECOWAS in principle 
recognizes the need to maintain and encourage intra-regional 
migration as a way of rationalizing and optimizing resources used at 
the regional level, toward the liberalization of trade and improved 
competition. The central assumption of this orientation can be 
summarized, at random, with the words of one of the founding 
fathers of the ECOWAS, Yakubu Gowon: 
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Even more than the promotion of trade, the mobility of labour and 
the other factors of production was central to ECOWAS and 
exemplified what the community was about. The free movement of 
persons within the region was both a repudiation of colonial 
frontiers in so far as they impeded the economic development of the 
new States, and an affirmation of the spirit of cooperation and 
mutual assistance.  
Gowon also revealed further that it was the “intention in creating 
ECOWAS that free movement of labour, like trade liberalisation, 
would proceed gradually…”. Thus the “first concern was to give 
security to those already living and working abroad in the interests 
of stabilising production and increasing economic growth”, while the 
relaxation of control was expected to “also channel skills and labour 
to countries where they were in short supply and provide at least 
temporary relief for those states without adequate employment 
opportunities” 
Question arising from the limitations of the Treaty provisions on free 
movement led to the signing of the Protocol on Free Movement, 
Residence and Establishment in member states on May 29, 1979 and 
which came to force in 1980. ECOWAS Treaty provides for the free 
movement of persons, residence and establishment, yet in practice 
this cannot be automatic, and therefore the phrases “by stages” and 
“by agreements with each other”. The main idea in the ECOWAS 
Protocol on Free movement of Persons is that at the end of a 
transitional period of fifteen years every, “Community citizen” has 
the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member 
State. The transitional period is trilaterally phased: Phase I – Right 
of Entry of Establishment (1980-85); Phase 2 – Right of Residence 
(1985-90); Phase 3 – Right of Establishment (1990-95). The transition 
from one phase to the next, according to Article 2 (4) of the 
Protocol, has to be “based upon the experience gained from the 
implementation of the first phase”. The Community has adopted all 
the three phases of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right 
of Residence and Establishment. However, ratification proved a 
difficult and protracted exercise. The implementation of the 
Protocol was evidently a serious problem.  Take for instance, all the 
ECOWAS citizens, excluding those defined by law as undesirable 
aliens, may enter without a visa and reside in any member-state for 
a maximum of ninety (90) days. The only requirement for the 
ECOWAS citizens is a valid travel document and international 
vaccination certificates. While the visa and entry permit 
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requirement may have been abolished in all the ECOWAS member-
states, it was observed that “nearly all the States still maintain 
numerous check-points, and the ECOWAS citizens are subject to 
administrative harassment and extortion”.   
The ECOWAS Agenda for Action was put in place to further ease the 
procedures at entry and exit points and facilitate free movement. It 
involves the use of ECOWAS Travel Certificate to facilitate and 
simplify formalities for cross-border movement. In 1993, it was 
reported that the number of countries printing the ECOWAS Travel 
Certificate increased substantially. The ECOWAS Travel Certificate 
has entered into circulation in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The Executive Secretariat 
of the ECOWAS claims that “high printing costs are a prohibiting 
factor for some Member States”, and financial assistance is being 
sought from a number of donors for such countries. Part of the 
ECOWAS migration rules is that ECOWAS citizens holding a Travel 
Certificate or Passport should be exempted from filling out 
migration and emigration forms for the ECOWAS Member States. The 
harmonized immigration and emigration forms were introduced, and 
to be used in only exceptional cases. But member-states have been 
reluctant to introduce these forms for use. There is also the ECOWAS 
Brown Card Motor vehicle Insurance Scheme that was introduced as 
an accompanying measure to the other programmes on free 
movements and goods. Twelve countries currently apply the 
scheme, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.   
But the problem is that two motor vehicle insurance systems are 
coexisting in the sub-region; the ECOWAS Brown card and the CIMA 
code. 
The non-implementation of most of the ECOWAS migration rules is 
often the rule than exception. In spite of the lofty provisions of the 
ECOWAS Treaty and protocols, the continuous initiation and 
application of discriminating economic policies against non-citizens 
(including Community citizens) by the various ECOWAS countries, at 
best, has ridiculed the claims on the liberalization of movement of 
persons in the ECOWAS sub-region. Today there are three levels of 
restriction against free movement in the ECOWAS region. The first 
level consists of the restrictive measures by individual member-
states of the ECOWAS to protect national interests defined in most 
cases as the security, income and safety of their nationals and their 
property.  Such include immigration laws, investment coded, 
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indigenization policies and programmes. The duplication and 
multiplication of regional integration schemes in the West Africa 
sub-region have always created the problem of multiple loyalties. 
The laws and rules of the smaller groupings (such as  UEMOA for 
example) on the movement of persons within a larger one like the 
ECOWAS have tendency to create problems except the policies and 
programmes of the two bodies are harmonized. The second level of 
restrictions represents the policies and programmes of the smaller 
groupings especially as they relate to population movement. The 
ECOWAS Treaty and Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons with 
its contradictions remains the third level of restrictions.  
 
Conflict management and good governance  
The Treaty of Lagos was silent on conflict management and 
prevention as well as good governance. It was however appreciated 
quiet early in the life of the Community that no meaningful 
cooperation could take place within the sub-region without peace 
and security. The Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the 
Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981) were 
incorporated into the ECOWAS Treaty, to address this concern.  
In August 1990 the ECOWAS sent a peace enforcement force – the 
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) – to Liberia 
following the outbreak of war in the country.  At the time the 
ECOMOG force moved into Liberia it was almost certain that neither 
UN nor the United States were going to intervene to bring about 
peace. Amadu Sesay observed that the ECOWAS “rose creditably to 
the challenges of conflict management and peace keeping in West 
Africa at a time when the great powers had literally abandoned West 
Africa, and indeed the continent as a whole, and focused their 
attention on Bosnia in Europe.”.  As most sections of the 
international community delayed and appeared confused, Liberia’s 
neighbours and other countries in West Africa were grappling with 
the inflow of refugees. This development no doubt affected the 
perceptions of the ECOWAS members-state that identified the 
Liberian crisis as threat to peace and economic well-being of the 
sub-region. Subsequently, in August 1990 a Peace Plan was 
announced for Liberia. In the official circles of some West African 
countries, especially Nigeria, the intervention was seen in terms of 
the defence of peace and security in the sub-region as well as in the 
spirit of good-neighbourliness. But support for the initial operations 
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of ECOMOG in Liberia was not total as some member states of 
ECOWAS only approved of ECOMOG operations quite reluctantly. 
The intervention by ECOMOG in Liberia was an ad hoc sub-regional 
response to the challenges of peace-keeping and conflict 
management. It was, therefore expected to be confronted with 
challenges. President Olusegun Obasanjo was later to point out that 
“ECOMOG badly fell short of its ideals in many ways.” Subsequent 
engagement of ECOWAS with conflict prevention and management 
enterprises in other parts of West Africa brought lessons all of which 
eventually led to the adoption in December 1999 of an ECOWAS’ 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace 
Keeping and Security. Together with the 1978 Protocol on Non-
Aggression and the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on 
Defence, the Mechanism provides the foundation for ECOWAS’ 
collective security system.  ECOWAS has continued to work towards 
improving its collective security system. For example, the ECOWAS 
Defence and Security Commission met in Abidjan from 14-18 August 
2002 and approved a harmonised training programme for ECOMOG 
stand-by units in three training schools in the region - the 
Peacekeeping School in Zambakro, Côte d'Ivoire, the Kofi Annan 
International Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, and the National War 
College in Abuja, Nigeria.  
In 17 October 2002 West African troops were deployed to Cote 
d’Ivoire as the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI). On 28 
February 2004, the UN Security Council voted in favour of 
integrating these West African peacekeepers into a UN Operation in 
Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). When crisis resurfaced in Liberia in 2003 
ECOWAS deployed a second peacekeeping operation in the region. A 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached on 18 August 2003 
after which the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) began deploying 
outside Monrovia. The UNSC later approved the conversion of 
ECOMIL into a UN International Stabilisation Force. 
The development of sub-regional mechanism for conflict 
management and peace-keeping has progressed far more in West 
Africa than any other parts of Africa. The accomplishment of 
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone has earned the regional 
organization a measure of international recognition. Arguably, this 
can be linked to paying due regard to the issues of good governance 
and democratization. Some of the principles espoused the Revised 
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, and 
other major declarations on the various conflicts in West Africa 
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underline the notion that democratization coupled with responsive 
and responsible governance are the most effective conflict 
management tools. Because there exist consensus among member-
States of the ECOWAS on the need to operate an effective sub-
regional conflict management mechanism that also takes seriously 
the issues of good governance and democracy, the returns on 
investment on collective security have been quite high in West 
Africa. Recently the sub-region was reported as experiencing an 
improvement in its security situation. This can be ascribed to 
commitment to the principles of democracy and good governance as 
expressed in the democratic elections in Burkina Faso, Liberia, and 
the in successful political transition that occurred in Guinea Bissau 
and Togo.  In Sierra Leone the ECOWAS supported the appointment 
of a Representative of the United Nations Secretary General to 
facilitate peace process and national reconstruction actions in the 
country. Also in Cote d Ivoire the ECOWAS remains committed to the 
implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1633 and the mechanism put in lace by the International Task Force.       
Despite some success stories, conflict management mechanism of 
ECOWAS is still largely underdeveloped, generally lacking 
established institutions and structures. Because of the absence of 
institutionalized structures for conflict management, conflict 
resolution initiatives have mostly taken ad hoc forms. In the Liberian 
conflict, for example, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government 
established a Community Standing Mediation Committee, which in 
turn created the ECOMOG at its inaugural session. In Sierra Leone, 
the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government did not formally 
approve of the ECOMOG force until some three months after its 
intervention. And in Guinea Bissau, the ministerial-level ECOWAS 
Defence Council voted to extend ECOMOG’s mandate to Guinea 
Bissau even before the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government had 
time to address the issue. The establishment of the ECOWAS’ 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution, 
Peacekeeping and Security in December 1999 is commendable as a 
commitment by the ECOWAS to create permanent machinery for 
ensuring lasting peace and stability. However, the Mechanism does 
not address the critical issue of who will determine when and how 
the military force under the Mechanism will be deployed. The 
ECOWAS like many sub-regional organizations in Africa lacks 
effective early warning systems, reconnaissance and logistical 
capacities and risk assessment capacities and therefore are 
considerably weak in conflict prevention. Although ECOWAS can now 
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boast of the Observation and Monitoring Centre which is the hub of 
the ECOWAS Early Warning System. The Centre has four Observation 
and Monitoring Zones within the sub-region. These are located in 
Banjul (Gambia), Monrovia (Liberia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) 
and Cotonou (Benin).  
 
IV. Global trade regimes and their implications  
The international economic system is less friendly to the economies 
of countries in the South.  Indeed the international economic system 
has become increasingly characterized by depressed world 
commodity market, discriminatory protection, and debt crisis. Also 
of importance is the fact of globalization and its impact on 
development processes. Arguably globalization is increasingly been 
made complex with developments in global trade regimes that seek 
for the liberalization of the international trading system. 
Developments within Europe and efforts towards increased 
integration of European economies are no doubt helping to reinforce 
new global trade regimes. These developments are already 
presenting African regional groupings with challenges. For example, 
individual West African countries and their regional grouping - 
ECOWAS - have relationship with EU, first under the EU-ACP 
Conventions (the Lome Conventions) and lately the Cotonou 
Agreement. The West Africa-European Community Regional 
Cooperation Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme for 
the period 2002 – 2007  shows the plans of the EU to support West 
Africa for the period 2002 – 2007 with an amount of €235 million..  
Under its current regional cooperation strategy for West Africa, EU 
will work closely with the two regional organizations with a mandate 
for the 9th EDF programming period: the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and ECOWAS. ECOWAS has a mandate to 
negotiate the EPAs in collaboration with the WAEMU. The strategy is 
expected to encourage in the long-term the convergence of the two 
integration processes. To boost the capacity of regional integration 
schemes for trade negotiations, 50 per cent of the RIP allocation will 
be assigned to the economic integration and trade support sector. 
Also, support will be given for the definition and implementation of 
regional sectoral policies aimed at complementing national 
programmes. The strategy will also support a facilitating, 
harmonizing approach at regional level to allow the free movement 
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of goods and people. Thus 35 per cent of RIP resources will be 
allocated to a second focal sector, transport. The political role of 
the region and in particular of the ECOWAS in conflict prevention is 
acknowledged in the strategy, and allocations are provided for this 
as part of the “non-focal” sectors which is planned to take 15 per 
cent of the RIP. The expected outcomes from this strategy are quite 
lofty, however attaining them is a distance reality especially in view 
of new developments in global system that emphasis liberalization 
and other aspects of the WTO rules to which the EU is now more 
committed.  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established as successor to 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), and its 
operations do not encourage the existence of special relationship 
such as the one between ACP and the European Union under the 
Lomé.  The Cotonou Agreement which replaces the Lomé Convention 
introduces new fundamental principles with respect to trade 
between EU Union and ACP countries. Under the Cotonou Agreement 
preferential market access commitments are to be made on the 
basis of reciprocity which is in contrast to what obtained under the 
Lome Conventions.  The terms and conditions of the reciprocal 
references are to be negotiated in the context of so-called Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPAs) between the EU and different country 
groupings within the ACP.  These negotiations are to be concluded 
by 1 January 2008, until which date non-reciprocal preferences 
under the Cotonou Agreement will be preserved. Least-Developed 
Countries (LDCs) from the ACP region are part of the negotiation 
process, while continuing to enjoy duty- and quota-free market 
access under the EU's unilateral Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative 
given to all LDCs.  The progressive removal of trade barriers after 
2008 is to lead to Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the EU and 
ACP regional groupings in conformity with WTO rules. The economic 
and trade negotiations within the framework of the Cotonou 
Agreement are meant to  produce ‘WTO compatible’ outcomes, 
which in effect, serve to further consolidate the hegemony of the 
WTO. 
The EU is already in the process of negotiation with four African 
regional groupings within the larger ACP group of countries which 
include the West African group ( ECOWAS and Mauritania), the 
Central African group (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de 
l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) and São Tomé and Príncipe),  the Eastern 
and Southern African group ( Eligible members of the Common 
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Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), with the 
exception of certain Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) members), and  the SADC group ( Angola, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland (BLNS). In its 
negotiations with these groups EU is set to promote multilateral 
trade liberalization, and at the same time seeks free trade with 
Africa. The critical question is to ask is whether the transformation 
from non-reciprocal trade agreements to reciprocal trade agreement 
will not make the agreements between EU and the ACP countries 
totally irrelevant.  
It was EU that started the idea of seeking free trade with Africa but 
others have joined especially US. The African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) was enacted on May 18, 2000. The original 
act has been amended twice. The aim is to establish a form of free 
trade area between the United States and Africa. Under AGOA, 
eligible countries in principle receive duty-free access to the U.S. 
market for most of their products. More than anything else this 
measure is expected to provide incentives to African countries to 
support efforts to further open their economies and build free 
markets. AGOA enjoys the support of the Bush administration. On 
July 13, 2004, the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 was signed by 
President Bush. Under this Act, AGOA beneficiary countries will have 
their non-reciprocal access to the US market extended until 2015.   
It is worth examining the effects of AGOA on the trade between 
Africa and the US. Official statistics from the United States 
Department of Commerce record an increase of 54 per cent (just 
over USD 14 billion) in African exports to the US over 2002. The 
breakdown is as follows: 80 per cent (over USD 11 billion) - 
petroleum exports; 20 per cent (less than $3 billion) - textiles and 
apparel (US $1.2 million) and agriculture (US $241 million). In its 
2003 report on AGOA utilization in 2002, the United States 
Department of Commerce identifies Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon, 
Lesotho, and Kenya as major beneficiary countries. The five 
countries accounted for 93 percent of AGOA utilization. An 
estimated 85 percent of non-petroleum AGOA exports originated 
from countries of Southern Africa. Total AGOA imports were US$ 
26.6 billion in 2004, representing an 88 percent increase from the 
year before. Excluding petroleum and related products, AGOA 
imports were valued at US$ 3.5 billion in 2004, representing a 22 
percent increase from 2003   
Both the US and EU are working hard in the Southern and Eastern 
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Africa, targeting regional economic organizations especially for a 
free trade agreements. Regional economic organizations in Southern 
and Eastern Africa, notably the SADC, COMESA, are already 
considering economic partnership agreement with EU that is 
modelled after the EU-South Africa free trade agreement. The US is 
exploring possibilities with SACU while EU, on its own, had in 1999 
signed a free trade agreement with South Africa.. Both the EU and 
U.S. are committed to the creation of free trade agreement with 
African countries. The question, however, is whether free trade 
access through AGOA, or economic partnership agreements that is 
tailored after the EU-South African mode, are not hindrances to 
regional economic integration in Africa. It is worth noting that 
neither ECOWAS nor any of the regional economic organizations in 
the West Africa has shown appreciable enthusiasm for economic 
partnership agreement. However, there is no guarantee against the 
spread of the idea across the entire continent of Africa. Given 
Nigeria’s strategic importance in West Africa, it is plausible to argue 
that Nigeria is be targeted for both the EU’s economic partnership 
and US’s AGOA that are seeking to penetrate the ECOWAS region. 
The provision for a flexible agreement which will run for twenty 
years, with a revision clause every five years has made some of 
these options possible in the Cotonou Agreement which also gives 
options to individual member states or regions to negotiate 
bilaterally with Europe.  
 
V. Challenges and opportunities 
The process of West African integration through the ECOWAS has 
suffered from many deficiencies. First, the production structures of 
member countries of ECOWAS are not complimentary. In other 
words, the production structures in member states of the ECOWAS 
are rather competitive rather than complement each other. This in 
turn reduces regional exchange. The strategy of reducing customs 
duties to increase intra-regional trade in West Africa has also shown 
reducing customs duties as necessary, but not sufficient for 
promoting intra-regional trade in West Africa. No doubt that the 
ECOWAS is confronted with so many challenges such as those 
enumerated in the previous section, however, there are new 
opportunities for the ECOWAS.   
After operating the ECOWAS Treaty for almost a period of two 
decades, the Treaty was critique as not paying adequate attention 
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to such issues as political cooperation, regional peace and security, 
the binding effect of the decisions of the Authority and the Council, 
and the supranationality of the ECOWAS. The Committee of Eminent 
Persons to Review the ECOWAS Treaty was set up to consider the 
legislative powers of the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government, the financing of the budgets of the Community 
institutions; and the decision making procedures of the Authority 
and the Council of Ministers. The Committee in its deliberations 
identified four issues: institutional matters; political cooperation, 
regional peace and security, financing of regional integration 
efforts, and available options for cooperation and regional economic 
integration. The ECOWAS Revised Treaty was adopted by the Heads 
of State in July 1993. The Revised Treaty is based largely on the 
recommendations of the Committee of Eminent Persons for the 
Review of the ECOWAS Treaty.  The Revised ECOWAS Treaty was 
adopted in the hope that it would mark “the institutional process of 
having a stronger and more dynamic ECOWAS…”.In a broader sense, 
the Revised ECOWAS Treaty comes across as a response to “the 
rapidly changing economic landscape in different parts of the 
world”, which has made the slowness of pace experienced over the 
past years of regional integration in West Africa most undesirable. 
According to the chairman of the Committee of Eminent Persons, 
“We believe therefore that the time is ripe to review the existing 
arrangements for cooperation and integration in West Africa and to 
update them in the light of the changes and reforms taking place 
both within and outside the region”. The Revised Treaty contains 22 
chapters divided in to 93 Articles. In Article 2 of the Revised Treaty, 
ECOWAS “shall ultimately be the sole economic community in the 
region for the purpose of economic integration and the realization of 
the objectives of the African Economic Community”. The Revised 
Treaty seeks to extend economic and political co-operation among 
member states. It designates the achievement of a common market 
and a single currency as economic objectives. Also in the political 
sphere it provides for a West African Parliament, an Economic and 
Social Council and the ECOWAS Court of Justice to replace the 
Tribunal. The Court of Justice shall carry out the functions assigned 
to its and it is independent of members state and other institutions 
of the Community. The judgments of the Court “shall be binding on 
the members state, the institutions of the Community and on 
individuals, and corporate bodies”. The treaty also formally assigned 
the Community with the responsibility of preventing and settling 
regional conflicts.  
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 Whereas it can be said that the overall logic and philosophy of 
the ECOWAS has not changed fundamentally, it should be 
acknowledge that new institutional framework put in place under 
the Revised Treaty to enhance the delivery capacity of ECOWAS. The 
idea was to assert the supranationality of ECOWAS institutions and 
facilitate their functions and roles in integration processes. Also, the 
seemingly refreshed commitment to the ideals of democratisation 
and good governance informed the provision for the establishment 
of an ECOWAS Parliament, tailored after the European Parliament, 
to exercise advisory and supervisory powers over the organs of the 
ECOWAS. 
 Looking at the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, it is possible that the 
ECOWAS drew some inspirations from the provisions of the African 
Economic Community (AEC) Treaty that regarded regional economic 
communities as building blocks in the construction of the African 
Common Market.  ECOWAS was subsequently designated one of the 
five regional pillars of the AEC. Together with The Arab Mangreb 
Union (AMU), Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), ECOWAS signed 
the Protocol on Relations between the AEC and RECs in February 
1998.  The Revised ECOWAS Treaty broadly reflects to some extent 
new trends in Africa and the world at large, taking into 
consideration some relevant developments on the international 
scene. For example, both the Revised ECOWAS Treaty and the 
Treaty Establishing the AEC indicate growing commitment to 
principles of good governance, and popular participation in 
development.   
The renewed commitment of African governments to regional 
cooperation provides ECOWAS with new opportunities and 
challenges. The aim of the AEC specified in the Treaty is to promote 
economic, social and cultural development as well as African 
economic integration in order to increase self-sufficiency and 
endogenous development and to create a framework for 
development, mobilization of human resources and material. The 
AEC further aims to promote cooperation and development in all 
aspects of human activity with a view to raising that standard of life 
of Africa’s people, maintaining economic stability and establishing a 
close and peaceful relationship between member states.  The AEC 
Treaty provides for the African Economic Community to be set up 
through a gradual process, which would be achieved by 
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coordination, harmonization and progressive integration of the 
activities of existing and future sub-regional economic communities 
(RECs) in Africa.  The RECs are regarded as the building blocks of the 
AEC. The existing RECs are: The Arab Mangreb Union (AMU), 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Common 
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS).  
The implementation of the AEC Treaty and the establishment of the 
AEC are through six-stage process lasting 34 years. It starts with 
strengthening of existing RECs and creating new ones where needed 
(5 years); through stabilization of tariff and other barriers to 
regional trade and the strengthening of sectoral integration (8 
years); establishment of free trade area and a custom union at the 
level of each REC (10 years); coordination and harmonization of 
tariffs systems among RECs, with the view to establishing an African 
Common market and the adoption of common policies (4 years); and 
integration of all sectors, establishment of an African Central Bank 
and a single African currency, setting up of an African Economic and 
Monetary Union and creating and electing the first Pan-African 
Parliament (5 years). The operational provisions of the AEC Treaty 
accord much importance to the building up of sub-regional 
integration though as a necessary precondition for continental 
integration. It was in this regard that Protocol on Relations between 
the AEC and the RECs was concluded and signed in February 1998. 
 The African Union (AU) is the latest of Africa’s broad regional 
cooperation scheme. Considering some provisions of the AEC, there 
was urgent need to integrate the political activities of the OAU with 
the provisions of the AEC Treaty on economic and development 
issues to avoid duplications.  The objectives of the AU, which 
include strengthening the founding principles of the OAU Charter, 
are more comprehensive than those of the OAU in acknowledging 
the multi-faceted challenges confronting the continent, especially in 
the area of peace and security. The Constitutive Act of the AU 
(CAAU), in its objective, place premium on the promotion of peace, 
security, and stability in Africa (Article 3 (f)). Also, enshrined in its 
principles are peaceful resolution of conflicts, the prohibition of the 
use of force or threats to use force, rights of intervention in the 
affairs of member states in case of “grave circumstances” related to 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Articles 4 (c ) , 
(f), and  (h) respectively ). 
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The ideals of AU are easily accommodated in the new thinking in 
ECOWAS. Thus a good relationship which is mutually beneficial to 
both AU and ECOWAS is envisaged. However, the future of the 
relationships between the AU and sub-regional organizations in 
Africa such as ECOWAS will depend, in no small measure, upon the 
development of both AU and the various sub-regional organizations 
themselves. This, of course, has several political ramifications 
demanding complex institutions and structures, and extensive 
political will, as well as unity of objectives and commitments at 
national, sub-regional, and continental levels. It suffices to say here 
that the successful development of both the AU and the various sub-
regional organizations in Africa depend first on the commitment of 
Africa states to redefine regional and sub-regional integration in a 
way that moves the process beyond state-centered approaches to 
include, among other things, the increased participation of civil 
society. Although there is some new thinking in this direction, which 
is already expressed in NEPAD and the AU, these new initiatives 
need to be translated into concrete agendas and programmes for 
civil society engagement with the state and other structures and 
processes of regional integration. 
The most recent African plan for economic development is the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) that is based on the 
New African Initiative (NAI), a merger of the Millennium Partnership 
for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega Plan. 
Again regional and sub-regional approaches to development are the 
key element through which many of the expected results are to be 
accomplished. 
These new initiatives in some senses are redefining regional 
integration more broadly to transcend strictly economic sphere. It is 
interesting to note that ECOWAS and other sub-regional schemes are 
fast buying into the ideals that these new broad based African 
continental development initiatives represents. These developments 
have shown many of African countries including those of West Africa 
to be on the side of increased commitment to regional cooperation 
and integration. Considering these trends and development 
especially those associated with the establishment of the AEC, the 
adoption of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, and lately  the AU, one can 
conclude that efforts in this direction will continue into the future.  
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VI. Conclusions, policy recommendations, and research 
priorities 
There today is no any controversy about the desirability of greater 
regional cooperation and integration among West African countries. 
However, the limited success of attempts at regional cooperation 
and integration in Africa generally raises questions on what is being 
pursued as the goals of regional integration. ECOWAS and many 
other regional schemes in the South to a larger extent hold 
theoretical allegiance to the European process of integration and 
the customs union theory. It has been observed that there are 
defects in the application of most Western theoretical constructs on 
economic integration to the setting in the South. For instance, there 
are political factors which are critical to the evolution and operation 
of regional integration in the South, and which the customs union 
theory conceals, in the bid to neutralize the political and ideological 
aspects of regional integration process. Such political considerations 
include the question of power relations (national and regional), the 
dominant ideology in the region, and the domestic politics in 
member states.   
On the one hand, one can argue with some conviction that the 
prospects for closer cooperation and regional integration among 
countries in West Africa are bright. Recent trends and developments 
show many of the countries to be on the side of increased 
commitment to regional cooperation and integration. Given the 
untiring efforts of these countries as well as the renewed interest of 
the political elites in Pan-Africanism which culminated first in the 
establishment of the AEC and  the inauguration of AU, one can 
conclude that efforts in this direction will continue into the future.  
Of course, this resurgence of interest in closer cooperation and 
regional among African countries and regional integration in Africa 
has been largely influenced by developments at national, regional 
and global levels. At the global level, the external environment has 
become less friendly to African economies. International economic 
environment has become increasingly characterized by depressed 
world commodity market, discriminatory protection, debt crisis, and 
the continuing distortions by TNCs.  On the positive side, there is a 
new global consensus on the validity of the basic principles of 
regionalism. The dominant idea, which is rooted in contemporary 
political economy thoughts, is that regional cooperation is still a 
very effective means of promoting the goals of self-reliance and 
economic development.   
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At the level of national politics, some progress has been recorded 
with respect to political reforms in many West African countries. 
This in turn is enhancing the capacity of these countries for regional 
integration in West Africa. Noticeably, many West African countries 
are democratizing; and the democratic space in many countries has 
been expanded and politics has become increasingly inclusive. In 
Nigeria and Ghana especially multi-party elections for ‘second 
transition’ were held successfully. On the other hand, dominant 
social forces within and outside the ECOWAS sub-region also 
demonstrate lack of interest in closer cooperation and greater 
regional integration in West Africa. The continued adherence to 
discarded models of development and administration, lack of 
initiatives and readiness to undertake the necessary internal socio-
economic restructuring and the dominant  pattern of accumulation 
which enriches a few at the expense of the majority have combined 
with other contradictions arising from the misuse of state power, 
wastefulness and misplacement of priorities to make national 
governments incapable of making their  economies become more 
interlinked in an integration framework. The lack of regime 
continuity which traumatized West Africa countries for considerably 
long period, and the manipulative and technological power of 
foreign capital also constitute impediment towards the pursuit of 
serious integrative processes in West Africa.  Moreover, the class 
configuration within West Africa, particularly the domination and 
control of state power and societal resources by a largely 
unproductive dominant class has often led to isolationist and 
pseudo-nationalist policies that do not promote regional integration. 
In view of the above, three phases of regional integration are 
conceivable for the ECOWAS to be able to promote development. I 
refer to these as the ‘national’, ‘regional’ and ‘global’. First and 
most important, individual member-state of the ECOWAS need a new 
‘national’ development programme for reversing underdevelopment. 
This implies embarking on internal changes in areas of political 
mobilization and participation, popular access to opportunities for 
majority, the overhaul of inherited socio-economic and political 
institutions, and the redefinition of relations with transnational 
corporations and other external forces.  
The second phase is the extension of structural changes made at the 
national level initially to sub-regional and later regional level. The 
will entails the ECOWAS to design and implement strategies that 
should encourage and seek means of facilitating increase in intra-
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regional trade, the improvement of transportation and 
communication system, the erection of political institutions that 
would assist in the improvement of political relations and 
understanding and also, the effort to re-define the role of the 
ECOWAS sub-region in the international division of labour.  Within 
this context the ECOWAS should be able to formulate policies 
towards the promotion and coordination of efforts to regulate the 
activities of TNCs within the sub-region, promote industrialization as 
a means of checking constant vulnerability to changes in global 
economy and the stimulation of the regional market and 
specialization, and also the development and growth of 
transnational civil society at the regional level through networks of 
civil society groups across national borders.  
The third phase requires a restructuring of the global system .This 
implies a collective regional effort that seek for the re-definition of 
the existing unequal power relations between the West African sub-
region and the North. These are prescriptions with several political 
ramifications demanding complex institutions and structures, and 
extensive political will, as well as unity of objectives and 
commitment.  It is good to note that some of the propositions 
presented above depend largely on sufficient participation of civil 
society; the people and their representatives in associations, 
professional societies, farmers’ group, women’s groups and so on, as 
well as political parties. Without sufficient participation of these 
groups either in the political process where decisions relating to 
regional cooperation and integration programmes are taken or 
through adequate consultation, efforts and initiatives stand the risk 
of becoming easy prey for sabotage. Although there is some thinking 
in this direction which is already expressed in the Revised Treaty 
and other documents, but these new initiatives need to be 
translated into concrete agenda and programmes for civil society 
engagement with the state and other structures and processes of 
regional integration.  
Based on the analysis in this paper, it is the third level that presents 
the greatest challenge to regional integration in West Africa.  
Strategies for addressing the constraining influence of the 
international environment require a restructuring of the global 
system This implies a collective regional effort that seek for the re-
definition of the existing unequal power relations between the South 
t and the North. Certainly these efforts must necessarily transcend 
the existing arrangements such as the USA’s AGOA, the Free Trade 
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Agreement (FTA) or the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).  
The rejection of these preferred arrangements of the North by the 
countries in the South has political implications that come with more 
responsibilities. Such rejection represents a desire for an alternative 
development framework which demands extensive political will, as 
well as unity of objectives and commitment.  The success of the 
alternative framework also  depend largely on sufficient 
participation of civil society; the people and their representatives in 
associations, professional societies, farmers’ group, women’s groups 
and so on, as well as political parties. Without sufficient 
participation of these groups either in the political process where 
decisions relating to regional cooperation and integration 
programmes are taken or through adequate consultation, efforts and 
initiatives stand the risk of becoming easy prey for sabotage. 
Although there is some thinking in this direction which is already 
expressed in ACP, NEPAD and the AU, but these new initiatives need 
to be translated into concrete agenda and programmes for civil 
society engagement with the state and other structures and 
processes of regional integration.  
Finally, some of the propositions above would definitely require 
further research, to identify and define issues more precisely. 
Therefore efforts at promoting regional integration in the South 
should necessarily consider the importance of scientific research 
which entails data and information gathering, analysis and re-
analysis. For example, Africa is the most balkanized regions of the 
world. Countries in the region are at varying levels of development. 
Also, there are wide differences in the historical and political 
backgrounds, the administrative and legal systems and monetary 
regimes. There is need to generate a lot of information to determine 
the characteristics of the countries and their economies. Research 
programmes would be needed to generate reliable and regular flow 
of data on the countries in the region. Also, lack of democratization 
is a major constraint towards effective regional integration. In this 
regard, the relationship between regional integration and 
democratic governance in Africa requires scholarly attention.  How 
do regional schemes such as ECOWAS and SADC promote good 
governance in national affairs? What are the models that are needed 
to be designed for regional schemes to monitor the compliance of 
African governments with the democratic principles and values in 
some of the new regional initiatives such as NEPAD? What is 
expected to happen to the ‘sovereignty’ of states in view of some of  
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the radical elements and initiatives in NEPAD and AU such as the 
peer review? What type of early warning system is required to 
identify sources of instability in the region? Other issues for in-depth 
include the role of the external environment on the direction of 
regional integration, the potential and actual capacity of the 
domestic forces such as the civil society to promote regional 
integration, the prospect of transnational civil society and cross-
border social and economic networking, and the idea of 
mainstreaming of gender into regional integration programmes.  
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